The Common Law of England in Virgina from 1776 to 1830 by Wren, J. Thomas
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book
chapters and other publications Jepson School of Leadership Studies
2006
The Common Law of England in Virgina from
1776 to 1830
J. Thomas Wren
University of Richmond, twren@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications by an authorized administrator of UR
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wren, J. Thomas, "The Common Law of England in Virgina from 1776 to 1830" (2006). Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles,
book chapters and other publications. 66.
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications/66
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. THOMA S  WRE N 
 
The Common Law of England in Virginia 1776 to 1830 
 
 
The Virginia Court o f Appeals embraced, on the whole, the English legal heri- 
tage, despite the violent separation from Great Britai n i n 1776. This loyalty to Eng- 
lish precedents was an illustration o f the conservative tenor o f the Revolution  i n 
Virginia.  The English common law  continued to be revered because i t  was per- 
ceived to be a bulwark o f English, and hence American, liberty. Adherence to Eng- 
lish precedent also maintained stable rules o f law, whic h i n turn protected existing 
property  rights. A t the same time, however, the Court o f Appeals was not slavishly 
devoted to the common law, and the court's departures from accepted precedent 
illustrate the nature o f Virginia's revolutionary  settlement. 
 
The instances o f judicia l deviation from English rules o f law during the Com- 
monwealth's first  decades were infrequent  but illuminating.  One example o f  the 
Virginia  court's  departure  from  English  precedents  occurred  when  the  English 
rules clearly contravened republican principles. The Court o f Appeals also consis- 
tently  supported the wi l l o f the Virgini a legislature, as expressed through statute, 
over  traditional  rules  o f  law.  This  demonstrated  a respect  for  manifest  polic y 
choices by Virginians over English traditions and was also an early indication  o f 
the court's perception o f its l imite d role i n the making o f policy. Another instance 
where the Court o f Appeals refused to blindl y  fol lo w  the English rules was when 
they di d not comport wi t h local conditions i n Virginia. Likewise, the court refused 
to stand on technicality when to do so prevented the execution o f an individual's 
obvious intent. Finally, the court also stepped i n when the common law or statute 
provided no clear guidelines. I n such cases, the Court o f Appeals articulated a pol- 
icy based upon principles o f "reason." 
 
Largely  through  the contributions  o f  the Court  o f  Appeals,  then, the  English 
legal heritage was adapted to the Virginia experiment. On the whole,  traditional 
legal rules went unchallenged, evidencing a conservative respect for stability  and 
property  rights. Where the court di d depart from English legal precedents, i t  was 
for the purpose o f implementing legislative policy, or adapting the common law to 
Virginia's  situation. The result was a legal system whic h was tradition-laden,  but 
not  tradition-bound;  a  conservative  yet  pragmatic  jurisprudence  whic h  was  to 
define Virginia's approach to the new order. 
Theoretically,  at  any  rate,  once  the  Virginia  colony  slashed its  ties  wit h  the 
mother country, the source and authority  o f the Brit ish  legal system were  extin- 
guished. I n this veritable "state o f nature," it was the duty o f the new  sovereign 
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and independent state to f i l l the vacuum by establishing a new legal order. 1   One o f 
the first orders o f business for the Virginia Convention i n Ma y  1776 was to address 
the matter o f the continued validit y i n Virgini a o f the Britis h statutes and the Eng- 
lish common law, that amalgam o f  rights,  duties, and liabil ities buil t  up  through 
centuries o f judicia l decisions i n the English courts whic h formed the basis for the 
vast majority o f the substantive law that governed the rights and obligations o f all 
English  subjects.  The  Virginia  Convention  di d  not  hesitate  and  immediately 
embraced the English system. I n order "t o enable the present magistrates and offi- 
cers to continue the administration o f justice  . . .  t i l l the same can be amply  pro- 
vided for,"  the Convention specifically  adopted the English commo n law, and all 
applicable English statutes passed before  1607, "unti l the same shall be altered by 
the legislative power o f this colony." 2  The end result  was, as St. George  Tucker 
described it , "Tha t the common law o f England, and every statute o f that kingdom, 
made for the security o f the life, liberty, or property o f the subject, before the set- 
tlement o f the Britis h colonies, respectively, so far as the same were applicable to 
the nature o f  their  nature  and circumstances, respectively, were brought  over  to 
America . . .". 3 
The  hasty  adoption  o f  the  essence  o f  the  English  legal  system  at  the  very 
moment the Virginians were engaged i n a violent revolt against that government is 
not the contradiction that i t  woul d  at first  appear. I n many  ways the  Virginians, 
taking their cue from the British "Opposition " writers o f the early eighteenth cen- 
tury, believed that their revolution was not a revolution  at all but merely  a last, 
desperate attempt to recover the traditional English liberties that had been lost at 
the hands o f a "corrupt " English government. 4  One o f the bulwarks o f those tradi- 
tional English liberties was the substance and procedure o f the English  common 
law. Accordingly,  the common law  was claimed as the "birthright  o f  American 
cit izens."5  The Virginia Court o f Appeals was full y  aware o f the libertarian nature 
o f  the  common  law  inheritance.  As  Judge  Tucker  phrased  it ,  "N o  man  I  trust 
woul d be more jealous than I o f the danger o f preserving any part o f the theory  o f 
monarchy i n our Commonwealth; but the rights o f individuals, upon whatever the- 
ory originally founded, after having settled into the know n law o f the land for six 
centuries, i n England, and after being considered i n a similar light i n this country, 
 
1   St. George  Tucker,   Blackstone's Commentaries (1803), vol. 1, app. E, p. 430. 
2 Stat, of May 1776, c. 5, § 6, W.  W.  Hening, Statutes at Large of Virginia, vol. 9, p. 126 
[hereinafter Hening]. 
3   St. George  Tucker,   Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, app. E, p. 432. See generally W. 
H. Bryson,  English Common Law in Virginia in Journal of Legal History, vol. 6, pp. 249-5 6 
(1985); W.  H. Bry son, Virginia Civil Procedure (2005), § 2.02. 
4   See generally Bernard   Bailvn,  The Ideological Origins of the American  Revolution 
(1967). 
5    J. R. Pole, Equality in the Founding of the American Republic, in G. S. Wood/J.    R. 
Pole, edd., Social Radicalism and the Idea of Equality in the American Revolution (1976), 
p. 18; P. Miller,   The Life of the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 
(1965), p. 122. 
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from its first foundation, ought not to be shaken, unless the imperative voice o f the 
constitution, or o f the legislature, shall compel i t to be done." 6 
There was also a more pragmatic reason for  adhering to the know n rules  and 
procedures o f the common law  whic h the Court frequently  articulated. That was 
the idea that i t was important that the law remain predictable. Nowhere was the 
rationale for this position more cogently arrayed than i n the early case o f  Common- 
wealth  v. Posey, whic h dealt wi t h a 200-year ol d precedent whic h had been defini- 
tive i n construing the English statute regarding the benefit o f clergy. (The "benefit 
o f clergy" was a privilege o f exemption from execution i n a capital crime granted 
originally  to  clergymen  but  later  expanded  to  include  many  others.)  I n Posey, 
Judge Wil l ia m Fleming gave the essential rule: "precedents, so long acquiesced in, 
cannot be overturned, without more danger than benefit, as no point w i l l ever be 
settled."7  Bu t  it was Judge Peter Lyons wh o  expressed the underlying  rationale: 
"Th e security o f men's lives and property require that [the earlier cases] should be 
adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct, and there is more danger 
to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition, because, when the 
rule is settled, men kno w how to conform to it ; but when all is uncertain, they are 
left i n the dark, and constantly liable to error . . . ". 8  The importance o f this holding 
did not go unrecognized. Nearly fifty  years later, i n  1833, Daniel Call, i n publish- 
ing his edition o f this case, added a postscript that "N o  cause decided, since the 
revolution, is more important than this, as i t fixes, by the opinion o f a large major- 
ity  o f  the judges, distinguished for  their patriotism,  independence, and ability, a 
principle  necessary  for  the tranquillity  o f  society  and the  safety  o f  the  general 
transactions  o f mankind, namely, that a settled construction o f  a statute forms  a 
precedent, whic h should be adhered to as part o f the law itself; and ought, upon no 
crit icism o f words, to be departed from. Accordingly, the decisions o f the court [o f 
appeals], since that period, abound wit h instances o f the same kind, but none  o f 
them state the ground and reason o f i t wi t h so much force . . .". 9 
 
Cal l was correct about the Court o f Appeals' continued respect for the rules  o f 
property as established by the English cases. The reports teem wit h similar profes- 
sions o f allegiance to the accepted common-law interpretations o f legal doctrines. 
I n 1827, the Court refused to overrule a longstanding interpretation o f the effect o f 
language creating a "future  interest" i n property, even though the legislature  had 
shown a clear dissatisfaction wit h the judicia l reasoning i n such cases. The Court, 
normally deferential to legislative wishes, here refused to change its position (i n a 
case that arose prior to the enactment o f the corrective statute). Judge Dabney Carr 
articulated the Court's reasoning. Whil e a statute was prospective, and gave every- 
one notice o f the new rule, a judicia l decision was by its very nature retrospective. 
 
6 Read v. Read, 5 Call 160, 173 (1804). 
ι  Commonwealth  v. Posey,  4 Call 109, 119- 120 (1787). 
8 Id.  at 120. 
9 Id.  at 124. 
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" I f  we  say  that  these  decisions  [that the  Court  has held  to  over  the  years]  are 
wrong/ '  asserted Carr, "al l  the estates whic h have been settled, all the  contracts 
whic h have been made, all the titles whic h rest on the foundation o f their [i.e., the 
former  cases'] correctness,  are uprooted." 1 0   No r  di d Carr  stop there. I f  al l those 
decisions  were  overturned,  i t  woul d be impossible to  foresee  "the extent  o f  the 
mischief." "But , only open the door," concluded Carr, "[and ] proclaim to the worl d 
that all whic h has heretofore  been done is wrong; and then we shall see the  wi l d 
uproar  and confusion  among titles, whic h wi l l  follow.  Is i t  not better to  prevent 
this, by holding on i n the course we have so long run?" 1 1 
 
So strong was the loyalty  to precedent that the Court  was wi l l in g  to follo w  a 
common-law rule even when the rationale underlying that rule had been lost i n the 
mists o f time. A s late as 1829, we find Judge Wil l ia m Cabell intoning: " I t  cannot 
be admitted, that a law ceases to exist, merely because the reason whic h gave rise 
to its adoption has ceased. I f this were admitted, we should demolish at once much 
o f the venerable fabric o f the common law." 1 2  An d Judge John Green, searching i n 
1830 for the reasoning behind the doctrine that all judgments "relate back " to the 
first  day o f the judicia l term, finally  threw up his hands i n despair. "Thi s  general 
principle o f the common law, like many others, is o f such remote antiquity and so 
long recognized without dispute that the reasons and polic y  are, i n great  degree, 
left to conjecture." 1 3   Even more revealing are the cases where the judges followe d 
the common-law  even i n the face o f their ow n  sense o f justice. Throughout  the 
first  five  decades o f  the new  republic, judges  subsumed their  ow n  views  to  the 
interest o f upholding precedent. 1 4  Perhaps Spencer Roane summed it up best i n the 
case o f Claiborne   v. Henderson  i n  1809. Roane noted that there are "innumerable 
instances to be found i n the books o f a reverence for decisions and rules o f prop- 
erty whic h have been established by the concurrent decisions o f successive judges 
and acted under for a long series o f time. They ought to be adhered to as the sine 
qua non o f al l certainty and stability i n the law, the private opinion o f any  single 
judge to the contrary  notwithstanding." 1 5 
 
Given this reverence for common-law precedent, both i n terms o f its protections 
o f individual liberties and because of the fear o f disruption from an overturning o f 
established rules, i t  should come as no surprise that the Virgini a  reports  abound 
 
io See, e.g., Bells v. Gillespie,  5 Randolph 274 (1827); Minnis v. Aylett,   1 Washington 300 
(1794); Boswell  and Johnson v. Jones,  1 Washington 322 (1794); Jiggets  v. Davis, 1 Leigh 
368 (1829); Blow v. Maynard,   2 Leigh 29 (1830); Coutts v. Walker;   2 Leigh 268 (1830); Cole 
v. Scott, 2 Washington  141 (1795); Claiborne v. Henderson,   3 Hening &  Munford  322 
(1809). 
h  Bells v. Gillespie , 5 Randolph 274, 285 (1827). 
12 Jiggets  v. Davis, 1 Leigh 368, 426 (1829). 
13 Coutts v.  Walker,   2 Leigh 268, 276 (1830). 
1 4   See, e.g., Cole v. Scott,  2 Washington 141 (1795); Claiborne  v. Henderson,  3 Hening & 
Munford 322 (1809). 
15 Claiborne  v. Henderson,  3 Hening & Munford 322, 376 (1809). 
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wit h professions  o f allegiance to the common law. 1 6   Indeed i t is logical that this 
should be so. As one commentator has put it , "Englis h precedents had been for tw o 
centuries the ways and woo f o f the Virgini a system, and i t was neither possible nor 
desirable to cast them aside." 1 7 
Perhaps the most tellin g indicator o f the continuing role o f the English common 
law i n Virginia's system came i n the early  1830s, when Henry St. George Tucker 
advised practicing attorneys concerning the matter o f rent payments when the les- 
sor died before  the rent  payment  was due. Under  English  law, the death o f  the 
lessor absolved the renter from  l iabil i t y  to pay rent, unless the lease  specifically 
provided otherwise. Althoug h common sense dictated that this should not be the 
outcome, Tucker warned lawyers that "un t i l . . .  some adjudication shall justif y  us 
i n department i n practice from English authority, it wi l l be always safest i n prac- 
tice to make reservations o f rent i n conformity wit h their decisions . . , " . 1 8 
 
Given the clear  commitment  i n  Virginia  to English precedent, what  becomes 
most  interesting  and  informative  are  the  exceptions  to  this  common-law  alle- 
giance. I t is manifest that only a deeply-held belief i n some countervailing value or 
circumstance could induce the Virginia Court o f Appeals to depart from its respect- 
ful attitude toward the common law. 
Interestingly, one rationale for deviating from the common law is expressed spe- 
cif ically  i n terms o f republicanism.  I n the  1806 case o f Baring   v. Reeder, Judge 
Roane acknowledged that " I consider myself bound to pare dow n the governmen- 
tal part o f the common-law o f England to the standard o f our free republican con- 
stitution        1 9    St.  George  Tucker  elaborated  i n  his  annotation  to  Blackstone's 
Commentaries:  "every  rule  o f  the  common  law,  and  every  statute  o f  England, 
founded on the nature o f regal government, i n derogation o f the natural and una- 
lienable rights o f mankind or inconsistent wit h the nature and principles o f demo- 
cratic governments were absolutely abrogated, repealed, and annulled by the estab- 
lishment o f such a form o f government i n the states, respectively. This is a natural 
and necessary consequence o f the revolution and the correspondent changes i n the 
nature o f the governments        2 0 
 
A further subtlety was inherent i n this perception o f the common law i n light o f 
republican principles. Even when the Virginia  courts were  at the height o f  their 
"homage-paying" to the English precedents, there was a subtle but very  important 
distinction between reliance  upon English decisions and their authority . The Revo- 
 
'6 C. F. Hobson, ed., The Papers of John Marshall, vol. 5, Selected Law Cases (1987), 
pp. 458, 462 [hereinafter Hobson, Selected Law Cases]; D. J. Mays, Edmund Pendleton 
(1952), vol. 2, p. 301. 
17    Mays,  Edmund Pendleton, vol. 2, p. 300. 
18   Henry  St. George  Tucker,   Commentaries on the Laws of Virginia (1831), vol. 1, bk. 2, 
p. 25. 
19 Baring  v. Reeder,  1 Hening & Munford 154, 161 (1806). 
20    St. George  Tucker,   Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, app. E, pp. 405-406. 
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lution, argued St. George Tucker, "b y separating us from Great Britai n forever, put 
an end to the authority   o f any future decisions or opinions o f her judges and sages 
o f  the law  i n the courts  o f  this  Commonwealth; those decisions  and opinions,  I 
make no doubt, w i l l long continue to be respected i n Virginia, as the decisions o f 
the wisest  and most upright  foreign judges; but  from  the moment  that  Virginia 
became an independent  Commonwealth,  neither  the laws, nor  the judgments  o f 
any other country, or its courts, can clai m any authority  whatsoever i n our courts . . . " . 2 1 
This, i n the end, was exactly  the point  Roane was making i n Baring   v. Reeder: 
"O n such rules o f the common law . . .  as are neither affected by a change i n the 
form  o f government, nor by  a variation i n the circumstances o f character o f  the 
nation, I  am free to avail myself o f the testimony o f able judges and lawyers  o f 
that country . . . I am not wi l l in g that an appeal to my pride, as a citizen o f indepen- 
dent America,  should prevail  over the best convictions o f  m y  understanding  . . . 
I wish it, however, to be clearly understood that I . . .  woul d not receive even them, 
as binding  authority.  I  woul d  receive  them merely  as affording  evidence  o f  the 
opinions o f eminent judges as to the doctrines i n question . . . " . 2 2 
A more obvious exception to the preeminence o f the English common law i n the 
court decisions o f Virginia occurred when the English precedents were  displaced 
by  statutory  provisions.  The  superiority  o f  enactments  o f  the  Virgini a  General 
Assembly  to  any  common-law  doctrine  was  a  commonplace.  This  was  made 
express  i n  the  statute adopting  English  common  law  and statute i n  Ma y   1776, 
when i t was declared that the English law was to remain " i n ful l  force, unti l  the 
same  shall  be  altered by  the  legislative  power  o f  this  colony." 2 3    The  Court  o f 
Appeals was assiduous i n upholding this doctrine o f legislative supremacy  where 
there was a direct conflict between statute and common law. Whittington   v. Chris- 
tian  is a typical example. That case, decided i n  1824, had to do wi t h a technical 
error i n an action o f ejectment. Whe n the defendant  sought to have the case dis- 
missed under the common-law rule, the Court looked to the more lenient provision 
o f the Virginia statute. " I t is true," admitted Judge Green, "that this construction o f 
the statute and the rule o f the common law referred to cannot exist together. The 
consequence is, that the statute abrogates the rule of the common law i n toto . . . " . 2 4 
Similarly,  i n  Templeman  v. Steptoe , Judge Tucker  noted i n  1810 that  under  the 
1785 statute o f descents, it was "to o plain to require proof, tha t . . . all former rules 
and canons o f  inheritance  and succession to estates withi n  this  Commonwealth, 
whether established by commo n law, or by statute, were rescinded, abrogated, and 
annulled, and that they cannot be revived i n any manner but by some express legis- 
lative provision for that purpose." 2 5 
 
 
21 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 436, n. 1. 
22 Baring  v. Reeder,  1 Hening & Munford 154, 162 (1806). 
23 Stat, of May 1776, c. 5, § 6, Hening, vol. 9, p. 127. 
24 Whittington   v. Christian , 2 Randolph 353 (1824). 
25 Templeman  v. Steptoe,  1 Munford 339 (1810). For similar examples, see White  v. Jones, 
4 Call 253 (1792); Bennet v. Commonwealth,  2 Washington 154 (1795); Shaw v. Clements,  1 
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Withi n the parameters  o f absolute statutory  superiority  i n areas o f actual con- 
flict,  however, there was  still room  for  a considerable  amount  o f  reliance  upon 
common-law  principles  and  remedies.  Oftentimes  Virgini a  statutes  were  exact 
copies o f or derivative from English predecessors. I n such cases, the relevant com- 
mon-law doctrines were often used to inform  and illuminate the statutory  provi- 
sions. 2 6  The Court o f Appeals was also quite careful when a new statutory remedy 
was enacted that deviated from traditional common-law  rights.  I n such cases, the 
Court acknowledged the statute, but took special care that the common-law reme- 
dies were also available, unless the statute clearly  abrogated those   rights.27     Thus, 
i n 1798, when a debtor sought to stave of f a creditor because he had not complied 
wit h the statutory requirements on a bond, Judge Pendleton for the Court held that 
it was "immaterial whether the creditor had or had not a remedy by motion, under 
the Ac t o f Assembly, since the act having no negative words, the creditor had his 
election to pursue the statutory mode, or his common-law remedy on the bond." 2 8 
Ten years  later, Judge  Roane commented wit h  respect  to  an  alleged  fraudulent 
transfer  that  "the  statutes i n question are merely  superogatory  i n relation to  the 
common l a w . . , " . 2 9  And , i n 1825, the Court held that the statute regarding proof o f 
a w i l l "i s only cumulative, and does not deprive any party o f remedy at common 
law. " 3 0   Similarly, the Court held that "whe n a statute gives a remedy without pre- 
scribing a particular  mode o f proceeding, the mode o f the common law is to be 
pursued." 3 1 
 
Another  situation i n whic h  the Court  o f  Appeals  was wi l l in g  to overcome  its 
predilection  for  common-law  precedent  was  when  the  local  conditions  did  not 
favor its application. 3 2   A s a contemporary commentator noted i n 1821, "Th e com- 
mon law  o f  England is, at this day, the law  o f  Virginia,  except  so far  as it  has 
altered by  statute, or  so far  as its  principles  are inapplicable  to the state o f  the 
country. I t adopts itself to the situation o f society, being liberalized by the courts 
according to the circumstances o f the country  and the manner and genius o f  the 
people." 3 3   Judge Roane added that " i n  applying  . . .  [the common law ]  we  must 
 
Call 429 (1798); Fleming v. Boiling , 3 Call 75 (1801); Branch v. Bowman, 2 Leigh 170 
(1830); Peasley  v. Boatwright,   2 Leigh 195 (1830); see also, e.g., Henry  St. George  Tucker, 
Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 86. 
26 Jackson v. Sanders,  2 Leigh 109, 114- 115 (1830). 
27 Braxton  v. Wins low, 1 Washington 31 (1791); Asbury  v. Calloway,   1 Washington 72, 74 
(1792); Gordon  admrs.  v. Justices  of Frederick, 1 Munford 1 (1810). 
28 Booker's  exrs.  v. M'Roberts,   1 Call 243, 244 (1798). 
29 Fitzhugh  v. Anderson,  2 Hening & Munford 289, 303 (1808). 
30 Smith  v. Carter,   3 Randolph 167 (1825). See also Johnston  v. Meriwether, 3 Call 523 
(1790); Beale v. Downman, 1 Call 249 (1798); Hooe v. Tebbs,  1 Munford 501 (1810); Henry 
St. George  Tucker,   Commentaries, vol. 2, pp. 13, 372. But see Taylor  v. Beck, 3 Randolph 316 
(1825). 
31 Braxton  v. Winslow,   4 Call 308, 318 (1791). 
32 Miller,   Life of the Mind, pp. 125- 127; O. and M. F. Handlin, Commonwealth (1947), 
pp. 134-135. 
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adapt [i t ] to the circumstances o f the case . . . so as to effect a reasonable and sub- 
stantial compliance therewith, rather than a literal one." 3 4 
 
One distinguishing circumstance i n the new commonwealth was the variation i n 
the court structure between Virgini a and England. Judge Pendleton addressed the 
issue i n 1792 i n Thornton  v. Smith when he held that the requirement o f asserting a 
court's  jurisdictio n  i n  the  pleadings  was  not  necessary  i n  Virginia.  Pendleton 
argued that the English rule "grew out o f the local situation o f the inferior courts i n 
that country,  and was grounded upon considerations  i n whic h  ours totally  differ 
from theirs." Afte r discussing the confusing mishmash o f jurisdictions i n England 
and the straightforward  statutory scheme i n Virginia, Pendleton concluded that i n 
this  case  "the  [English]  precedents  cannot  bin d  us . " 3 5   A  similar  situation  con- 
fronted  Judge Tucker  i n  the  1809 case o f  Nimmo's   exr. v.  Commonwealth .   The 
question there was whether a decedent's executor was presumed to kno w o f pend- 
ing judgments whic h migh t bin d the estate. Tucker acknowledged that  presump- 
tio n applied i n England. "But , "  he interjected, " i t is not every common-law  rule, 
founded upon the judicia l system o f that country, that can be deemed, i n strictness, 
applicable to the circumstances and situation o f this." After noting that there were 
only four courts o f record i n England compared to over tw o hundred i n  Virginia, 
Tucker  concluded:  "Ca n  i t  be  supposed,  that  under  such  circumstances  . . .  an 
executor must at his peril take notice o f  all judgments against the testator i n  his 
lifetime, i n what court, or part o f the state soever, the same may be entered? I con- 
ceive not  . . .  " . 3 6    Similarly, the dispersed nature o f  Virginia  courts forced  some 
departures   from   traditional   requirements.   Often   pleading   requirements   were 
relaxed. "Considering the circumstances i n this country," noted the Court, "and the 
dispersed situation o f the attorneys and their clients who can seldom communicate 
wit h each other but at court, justice seems to require a relaxation i n these rules o f 
practice." 3 7 
 
The demands o f settling a new country also affected the substantive rules o f the 
common law. I n England, a mere tenant on the land was l imite d as to his utiliza- 
t ion o f permanent resources o f the land such as timber. I f he were to cut more trees 
than was reasonably necessary for fencing and the like, he was liable to the owner 
o f the land for "waste." Bu t i n Virginia, where there was a more compelling need 
to tame and make productive the land, the rule was different. I n Findlay   v. Smith, a 
life tenant was permitted, i n 1818, to extract unlimite d quantities o f salt, and to use 
 
 
33 William Munford in Findlay  v. Smith,  6 Munford 134, note (1818). 
34 Coleman, exr.  v. Moody,  4 Hening & Munford 1, 20 (1809). 
35 Thornton  v. Smith,  1 Washington 81, 83-8 4 (1792). 
36 Nimmo's  exr.  v. Commonwealth,  4 Hening & Munford 57, 66 (1809). 
37 Downman v. Downmans exrs.,  1 Washington 26, 28 (1791), VK //. Bryson,  Virginia Law 
Reports and Records, 1776-1800, in A. Wijffels, ed., Case Law in the Making (Comparative 
Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, Band 17/11, 1997), p. 101; see 
also Tabb v. Gregory,   4 Call 225, 229 (1792). 
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all o f the woodland, i f necessary, to supply fuel for the operation. A s Judge Wi l - 
l ia m Cabell explained, "the law o f waste, i n its application here, varies and accom- 
modates itself to the situation o f our new and unsettled country." 3 8   Similarly  the 
common-law  right  o f  a purchaser o f  the land to the tenant's growing  crops  was 
questioned i n Virginia, "where lands are seldom let out upon leases . . . " . 3 9 
 
I n sum, the Virgini a Court o f Appeals was wi l l in g to change common-law rules 
and procedures  to conform  to the requirements  o f  Virgini a  experience. 4 0   On the 
other hand, such deviations were relatively infrequent and always accompanied by 
an explanation o f the circumstances whic h demanded the variance. 
Another exception to the tradition o f common-law preeminence i n the Virginia 
courts was broad i n concept but rather strictly l imite d i n practice. I t arose because 
there were inevitably times when the common-law precedents gave no  guidance, 
or provided conflicting rules o f law. I n such cases, by default, the Court had to step 
i n and make a policy decision wit h l i ttl e guidance from the precedents. Such was 
the case o f the interpretation of an insurance contract i n Bourke  v. Granberry    i n 
1820. There, the precedents were diverse and conflicting, forcing Judge Roane to 
finally conclude, "W e are to judge for ourselves i n this chaos o f judgments, and we 
submit the result o f our best deliberations." 4 1   Judge Coalter faced a similar  situa- 
tion i n  1829 regarding the admissibility o f proof o f handwriting i n a forgery  case. 
"The decisions, so far as I  have examined them, are not, I think, very  consistent 
wit h the general rules o f evidence, or wit h each other, or wit h the principles  by 
whic h they profess  to be governed; nor, indeed, have I  as yet been full y  able to 
comprehend those principles." 4 2   I n such cases, the Court had no alternative but to 
strike out on its ow n withou t  solid guidance from  the precedents. On the whole, 
however, the Virgini a Court o f Appeals was very circumspect i n availing itself o f 
the opportunity to clai m a lack o f positive direction from prior cases, thus justify - 
ing the creation o f a new polic y initiative by judicia l f ia t . 4 3 
 
Despite the tradition o f respect for precedent, there was at least one particular 
area where the Court o f Appeals di d evince a resistance to the pattern o f adherence 
to common-law rules, i n the interpretation o f wills . Cases involvin g wi l l s provided 
much o f the grist for the mill s o f justice i n the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
 
38 Findlay   v. Smith,  6 Munford 134, 142 (1818); see Henry  St. George  Tucker,   Commen- 
taries, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 4, 50. 
39 Crews  v. Pendleton,   1 Leigh 297, 302 (1829). See also Ross v. Poythress,   1 Washington 
120 (1792) [regarding lack of hard money in Virginia]. 
40 G. R. Wood,  Creation of the American Republic (1969), p. 296. 
41 Bourke  v. Granberry,   Gilmer 16, 26 (1820). 
42 Rowt's  admr.  v. Kile's  admr. , 1 Leigh 216, 224-225 (1829). 
43 In only two cases does the Court intimate that it was primarily  "result-oriented." In 
Martin   v. Lindsay's  admr. , Judge Brooke said, "It is of more importance to decide causes in 
this court, than to settle or unsettle the law." 1 Leigh 499, 513 (1829). And in Coleman exr.  v. 
Moody,  Judge Roane noted: "We do not sit here to lay down mere abstract propositions, but 
to administer justice." 4 Hening & Munford 1, 20-2 1 (1809). 
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centuries. An d i n most w i l l cases, the standard deference to English precedent was 
evident. Indeed, one commentator has noted that "owin g to their great complexity, 
w i l l  construction cases came before  the appellate court i n disproportionate  num- 
bers. They afforded numerous occasions for the bar and bench to display their mas- 
tery o f the abstruse doctrines o f property la w and the technical rules for construing 
will s  that had evolved wit h  ever greater refinement  i n a multitude o f cases. Not 
surprisingly, the string o f English citations was longest i n w i l l cases."4 4 
 
One aspect o f  w i l l  construction, however, provided  an exception to this  rule. 
This occurred i n the cases involvin g the interpretation o f the intent o f the testator 
(the writer o f a wi l l ) i n the application o f the provisions o f the wi l l . The resistance 
to common-law rules i n such cases was partially justified i n the familiar terms o f a 
lack o f clear guidance fro m the common-law precedents. I n a 1792 case, the court 
expressed its willingness to follo w  the traditional rules  o f  w i l l  construction i f  i t 
could fin d them. " I f we could discover those settled rules o f construction," lamen- 
ted the Court, "w e woul d pursue them. But , after all our researches, we are much 
inclined to affirm  . . .  'that cases on wil l s  serve rather to obscure, than  illuminate 
questions o f this sor t ' . " 4 5  Tw o years later Judge Edmund Pendleton reiterated this 
argument. " I n disputes upon wil l s . . . whic h depend . . . on the intention o f the tes- 
tator . . . adjudged cases have more frequently been produced to disappoint, than to 
illustrate  intention."  As  a  result,  Pendleton  concluded  that  the  proper  way  to 
decide such cases was not to rely upon precedent, but upon "the state and circum- 
stances o f each case." 4 6 
 
Bu t this reliance upon the crutch o f a lack o f "settled rules o f construction" was 
a  bit  disingenuous. For i n the same case that Pendleton decried a lack o f  estab- 
lished precedent, he went on to reveal the real theory underlying his approach to 
such cases. " I am free to own, " admitted Pendleton, "that where a testator's inten- 
tion is apparent to me, cases must be strong, uniform, and apply pointedly before 
they wi l l prevail to frustrate that intention." 4 7   I n supporting the perceived intention 
o f  testators over  technical rules  o f  law, the Court  o f  Appeals  was not  so  much 
rejecting  precedent  as it  was  acknowledging  and effectuating  the  clear  aims  o f 
common men, unschooled i n the law. Judge Carr i n  1830 stated the reasoning  o f 
the Court simply and directly. "Th e enquiry is to the meaning o f the bequest: it is a 
pure question o f  intention. There  are no technical words  or forms  o f  expression 
used i n the wi l l .  I t  is, evidently, the production o f a plai n man, who, though he 
understood very wel l what he meant to say, and was able to express himself quite 
intelligibly, knew nothing o f legal forms and legal phrases. To ascertain his mean- 
ing, we must not loo k to treatises on wills , or to adjudged cases, but simply to the 
 
44    Hobson, ed ., Selected Law Cases, p. 463. See e.g., Roy v. Ganietî, 2 Washington 9 
(1794). 
45 Kennon v. M'Roberts , 1 Washington 96, 102 (1792). 
46  Shermer  v. Shermer's  exrs ., 1 Washington 266, 271 -27 2 (1794). 
47 Id, . at 272. 
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words he has used." 4 8   Carr' s statement, although more eloquent, was really  echo- 
ing the same point made by the Court i n 1792. I n that year, the Court i n Kennon  v. 
M'Roberts   set up a simple rule o f interpretation: " i f the testator use legal phrases, 
his intention should be construed by legal rules. I f he uses those that are common, 
his intention, according to the common understanding o f the words he uses, shall 
be the ru le ." 4 9 
 
Perhaps  the  most  il luminatin g  cases where  a testator's  intent  clashed  wit h  a 
legal rule came when there was a devise (i.e., a testamentary disposition o f  land) 
o f real property to the testator's children. I n  1797, for example, John Guthrie, an 
uneducated man, left land to his eldest son James. Everything about the wi l l  indi - 
cated Guthrie's intention to leave the land to James absolutely, without  l imitatio n 
or restriction. But Guthrie di d not devise the land to James "and his heirs," and by 
leaving out those three key words, the common-law rule had i t that James took the 
land only during his lifetime, and that at his death i t went not to James' heirs or his 
ow n  devisees,  but  to  the  "residuary  legatee"  o f  Guthrie's  wi l l .  The  Court  o f 
Appeals i n this case concluded that " i f we consult common sense and the reason o f 
mankind, we shall be satisfied that where a man gives an estate i n lands, without 
l imitatio n  or restraint, he means to give his whole interest." 5 0   An d  so the  Court 
continued to hold unti l the problem was remedied by a statutory abrogation o f the 
common law. 5 1 
Despite examples o f the Virgini a Court o f Appeals effecting  a testator's intent 
over technical rules o f law, there were acknowledged limitations to this policy  i n 
both theory and practice. Althoug h it was a familiar refrain throughout the period, 
Judge Carr perhaps articulated it best i n 1825: " I n the constructions o f wil ls, " said 
Carr,  "the cardinal point, the polar  star, is the intention o f the testator; and this 
being clear, must be pursued, unless  it  be in  violation   of some fixed   and  settled 
rule." 52       Just  exactly  what  were  the  "fixe d  and settled"  rules  whic h  no  testator 
could abridge were never clear, and, indeed, seemed to vary.  St. George  Tucker 
thought  them  l imite d  to  such  citadels  o f  common-law  construction  as the  rule 
 
48 Madden  v. Madden's  exrs ., 2 Leigh 377, 380 (1830). See also Wyatt   v. Sadler's  heirs , 1 
Munford 537 (1810); Carnagy  v.  Woodcock  and Mackey,  2 Munford 234 (1811). 
49 Kennon v. M 'Roberts,   1 Washington 96, 100 (1792). 
50 Fairclaim   v. Guthrie , 1 Call 7, 15 (1797). 
51 See also Davies  v.  Miller,  1 Call 127 (1797); Kennon v.  M'Roberts,    1 Washington 96 
(1792); Johnson v. Johnson 's widow ;  1 Munford  549 (1810); Stat, of  Oct.  1785, c. 61, 
Hening, vol. 12, p. 140. For other cases where the testator's intent affected the application of 
a rule of law, see Grijfith    v.  Thomas,  1 Leigh 321 (1829) [rule against perpetuities]; Tabb  v. 
Archer,   3 Hening & Munford 399 (1809); Lupton v.  Tidball,    1 Randolph 194 (1822); Henry 
St. George  Tucker,   Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 140- 142 [rule in Shelley's case]; Harri- 
son v.  Allen, 3 Call 289 (1802); Hyer  v.  Shobe, 2 Munford 200 (1811); Henry  St.  George 
Tucker,   Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 146 [after-acquired lands, contingent interests]. 
52 Goodrich  v. Harding,   3 Randolph 280, 282 (1825) (emphasis supplied). See also Roy v. 
Garnett,  2 Washington 9, 31 (1794); Reno's exrs.  v. Davis,  4 Hening & Munford 283, 291 - 
292(1809). 
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against perpetuities (whic h forbade makin g property  inalienable beyond a certain 
length o f time) or the prohibition against devises i n mortmain (that is, to religious 
institutions). 5 3   Bu t i n a series o f cases adjudged between 1791 and 1803, we find 
the  Court  upholding  rules  o f  law  against  intention  i n  a  far  wider  variety   o f 
instances. Thus, despite the testator's apparent intention, the court strikes dow n the 
intended conveyance o f after-acquired lands, 5 4  a 999-year lease,5 5  and a remainder 
i n land. 5 6 
The  Court's  struggles  wit h  the rule  o f  law  versus the intent  of the testator is 
revealing regarding  the prevailing  attitude toward the common law. O n the one 
hand, we see the Court wi l l in g to throw over the shackles o f ancient law to give 
effect to the obvious desires o f the individuals. I n so doing, the Court was merely 
acknowledging  a pragmatic  reality  o f  the Virginia  countryside:  unschooled  men 
often made wil l s wherein their intent was clear, but whose language di d not com- 
port wi t h all the legal niceties. The Court chose, where possible, to recognize that 
reality. On the other hand, the Court could not, would  not, overthrow the familiar 
rules o f common-law construction entirely. This was more than mere antiquarian- 
ism. Again, the Court o f Appeals shied before the bugbear o f unsettling property 
rights.  As Judge Peter Lyons phrased the argument i n 1803, " I t is to no purpose to 
be  arguing  about  the  intention .. .  for,  mere  intention  cannot  prevail  against  a 
settled rule  o f  interpretation,  whic h  has fixe d  an appropriate  sense to  particular 
words; because, when the sense is once imposed, they become the indici a o f the 
testator's mind, unti l the contrary  is shown by countervailing expressions ... I t is 
better that it should be so, too, for the law ought to be certain; and, when the rule is 
once lai d down, i t should be adhered to. Otherwise, what is called liberality, at the 
bar, w i l l degenerate into arbitrary discretion, and all must depend upon the wi l l  o f 
the judge . " 5 7   Once again we see that interesting mi x o f an abiding respect for the 
common law, leavened by the acknowledgment o f the requirements o f  pragmatic 
reality. An d through it all was woven the continuing support for fixed and settled 
rules o f property. 
 
Judge Lyons'  concern that the law migh t  "degenerate into arbitrary  discretion, 
and all must depend upon the wi l l o f the judge , " 5 8   provides a key insight into why 
 
 
53     St. George  Tucker,   Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 381, n. 12. 
54 Shelton v. Shelton,  1 Washington 53 (1791). 
55 Minnis  v. Aylett,   1 Washington 300, 302 (1794). 
56 Hill  v. Burrow,   3 Call 342 (1803). This case involved a "remainder in tail" which was 
an ongoing matter of judicial attention. It should be noted that the examples of a common- 
law rule overriding individual intention fell chiefly  in the early decades of the period. It 
would be hasty to immediately jump to any conclusion on this score, however, since Can- 
states as late as 1825 the principle that rules of property can overturn intent. Goodrich   v. 
Harding,   3 Randolph 280, 282 (1825). 
57 Hill  v. Burrow,   3 Call 342, 353 (1803). 
58 Ibid.  See also Young  v. Gregory,   3 Call 446 (1803); St. George  Tucker,   Blackstone's 
Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 53, n. 10; ibid.,  app. C, p. 133. 
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a republican commonwealth like Virginia woul d unhesitatingly accept an antique 
system o f judge-made la w derived from an essentially monarchical system. For the 
judicia l opinions collectively know n as the "commo n law " were not perceived as 
the collective opinions o f appointed judges, but as reflections o f a "higher "  entity, 
and it was the nature o f this "higher law " to be protective o f individua l  rights  and 
property. Indeed, it was only when a court threatened to deviate from the accepted 
notions  o f  the  "commo n  law "  that  individua l  liberties  and property  rights  were 
endangered. 5 9  This conception o f law had been suggested by Coke, propounded by 
Locke,  and  elevated  to  a  commonplace  by  Blackstone. 6 0    I n  Virginia,  Spencer 
Roane admitted i n 1803, " I hold myself bound by well-established precedents, and 
disclaim any power to change the law. " 6 1    Such a position espoused the  familiar 
doctrine o f predictability i n law, but i t also contained an undercurrent o f  republi- 
canism. Thus, to Virginians,  adhering to the common law  was more than just  a 
bow to accepted wisdom, more than a means to avoid unsettling existing property 
rights;   i t  was an affirmative  statement o f  their belief i n  natural law  and  natural 
right,   whic h  i n  turn  was  a fundamental  basis  o f  traditional  English,  and  hence 
American, l iberties. 6 2 
 
I n sum, the Revolution di d not mean the overthrow o f English jurisprudence  i n 
Virginia. Rather, "the great body o f English la w . . . remained intact i n post-Revolu- 
tionary  Virginia.  Its  rules  and principles  were  the predominant  authority  relied 
upon i n arguing and deciding cases . . . " . 6 3   This is not to say that the common law 
was accepted unquestioningly. Whe n the English cases di d not suit the practical or 
ideological demands o f Virginians, the Court di d not hesitate to cast them aside. 
Henry St. George Tucker put i t succinctly i n 1831: "the common law o f England is 
at this day the law o f this commonwealth, except so far as it has been altered by 
statute, or  so far  as its principles  are inapplicable to the state o f the country,  or 
have been abrogated by the revolution and the establishment o f free  institutions." 6 4 
Through i t  all, the Virgini a  Court  o f  Appeals incorporated the English  commo n 
law into the emerging jurisprudence o f Virginia i n a manner consistent wit h repub- 
licanism. I n the great majority  o f  cases, the influence  o f  the English  precedents 
 
 
59     W.  E. Nelson , Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change in 
Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (1975), pp. 18-19; Miller,   Life of the Mind, pp. 234 - 
235; Hobson, ed., Selected Law Cases, p. lix. 
60 Miller,   Life of the Mind, pp. 130-131, 164- 165. 
61 Young  v. Gregory,   3 Call 446 (1803). 
6 2    When the Virginia court could find no appropriate precedent, it specifically looked to 
decide the matter "upon principle." See Shelton v. Shelton,  1 Washington 53, 64 (1791); Ken- 
non v. M'Roberts,   1 Washington 96, 100 (1792); Shaw v. Clements,  1 Call 12, 429, 434, 436, 
442 (1798); Wilkinson   v. Hendrick,   5 Call 12 - 13 (1804); Bourke  v. Granberry,   Gilmer 16, 25 
(1820); Richards  v. Brockenbrough's   admr. , 1 Randolph 449, 454 (1823); Blow v. Maynard,   2 
Leigh 29, 62 (1830). 
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went unchallenged. Whe n the English decisions were distinguished or  overruled, 
the Court always articulated its reasoning for the exception. And , indeed, it is the 
exceptions that prove the rule. The willingness o f the Virgini a Court o f Appeals to 
follo w  the commo n law when to do so protected individua l liberties and predict- 
ability  i n  social  and economic  relations,  but  to  depart  from  English  precedent 
when i t  seemed contrary  to republican principles  or to the circumstances  o f  the 
new country, or, especially, to the wi l l o f the people voiced through statute, proved 
its commitment to a new order. For all this, however, there is a strain o f conserva- 
tism i n the attitude o f the Court o f Appeals toward the English heritage. 6 5  Wit h the 
exception o f occasional and necessary deviations, the commitment was to predict- 
ability and stability, whic h could best be achieved by conforming to the safe and 
familiar rules and procedures o f the English common law. 
O f course, as the decades progressed, an indigenous Virgini a law also gradually 
developed, although, by  1830, the citations to  Virginia  cases were  stil l  outnum- 
bered by those to their British counterparts. 6 6   I t is an interesting study to review 
how  the Virgini a  Court  o f  Appeals  treated Virgini a  precedent.  Predictably,  as a 
general rule, the ability to cite a Virginia decision as directly on point was a boon 
to any lawyer's  argument. 6 7   Bu t there appears an interesting dichotomy  between 
the Court's treatment o f the pre-Revolutionary General Court cases and the respect 
given the postwar decisions o f the Court o f Appeals. I t was not uncommon for the 
Court o f Appeals to disregard the decisions o f the colonial (i.e. "royal" )  General 
Court. A t one point the Court noted that " i t has never been pretended that the deci- 
sions o f  the ol d General Court  have been considered as conclusive." 6 8    Partially 
this was because, technically, the ol d General Court was not a court o f last resort. 
I t was left unstated, and therefore  a matter o f speculation, whether this disrespect 
had anything to do wit h that Court's close association wit h the hated colonial gov- 
ernors. 6 9 
 
The point about a willingness to overrule General Court cases should not be 
overstated. Consistent wit h  our findings  regarding  the English common law, the 
stress was o n continuity  rather  than change. Perhaps no case better displays  the 
limite d  nature  o f  the Revolution's  impact  on  Virgini a  la w  than that  o f Wallace 
v. Taliaferro   , decided i n 1800. That adjudication brought into question the binding 
power  o f  precedents  from  the  ol d  General  Court  regarding  property  i n  slaves. 
Judge Roane was aghast at the very  thought o f questioning that line o f cases.  " I 
 
65     Hobson, ed., Selected Law Cases, p. 459. 
66 Ibid,pp.    458-459. In volume 1 of B. W Leigh, Reports (1829), 151 English cases 
were cited, and 140 Virginia cases. For an example of Virginia precedent as determinative, 
see Mickie  v. Lawrence,  5 Randolph 571, 573, 576 (1827); see also Spencer v. Moore,  4 Call 
23 (1798). 
67     Hobson, ed., Selected Law Cases, p. 462. 
68 Claiborne  v. Henderson,  3 Hening & Munford 322, 375 (1809). 
69 Wallace  v. Taliaferro, 2 Call 447, 469, 489 (1800). See also Pickett  v. Claiborne,  4 Call 
99 (1787); White  v. Johnson,  1 Washington 159 (1793). 
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had supposed that no question woul d have been made o f the competency o f those 
decisions to fi x rules o f property i n this country . . . i f we reject such rules o f prop- 
erty as have been fixed by that court and under whic h our people have regulated 
their property  through a long series o f time, the mischief, whic h woul d ensue, is 
incalculable." 7 0   I t was Judge Pendleton, however, wh o directly responded to any 
insinuation that the Revolution had engendered a change i n the law o f property  i n 
Virginia. Pendleton assumed that such cases had been brought "t o discover i f  the 
Revolution had produced any change i n the legal sentiment. Fortunately, for  the 
peace o f the country, the experiment  failed,  and the point  was left  at rest."  The 
chief justice  concluded:  " I  imagine  some  young  gentleman  o f  the  bar,  not  ol d 
enough to know the practice of the country, nor acquainted wit h the former  deci- 
sions, advised the su i t . . . " . 7 1  Nowhere can one fin d a better illustration o f a Revo- 
lution  admittedly  fought  for  "liberty, "  but  one i n  which ,  all  the while, property 
rights  were conservatively protected. 
 
I n any event, the Justices appeared even less l ikel y to overrule the decisions o f 
their ow n predecessors on the Virginia Court o f Appeals. I n an early case, Judge 
Pendleton felt he must offer an explanation for an apparent deviation from a recent 
adjudication. I n Jollife   v. Hite,  he admitted that "Uniformit y  i n the decisions  o f 
this Court is all important. We have, however, progressed but l ittle from the com- 
mencement o f our existence; and, if, i n any instance, we should recently discover a 
mistake i n a former  decision, we should surely correct it , and not let the error go 
forth to our citizens, as a governing rule o f their conduct." 7 2  As the decades pro- 
gressed, the rare instance o f the Court overruling a previous decision was without 
exception accompanied by  such protestations as Judge Carr's i n  1830: " I  believe 
there are few  men less disposed than myself to disturb the decisions o f this court 
made by  the enlightened judges  who  have gone before  us. Cases, however,  do 
sometimes  arise  i n  whic h  our  respect  for  their  decisions  must  yiel d  to  a  more 
imperious duty." 7 3 
 
The discussion thus far  has neglected the reception greeted  pre-Revolutionary 
English statutes i n  Virginia.  That  story  is more  straightforward.  The  same  ordi- 
nance o f Ma y  1776, whic h  accepted the English common law  also adopted  "a l l 
statutes  or  acts  o f  Parliament  made  i n  aid  o f  the  common  law  prior  to   . . . 
[1607]." 7 4  Here, too, the Virgini a Convention evinced a willingness to rely heavily 
upon the English legal heritage. But, i t is interesting to note the English statutes 
that were not  adopted by  the Virginia  Convention i n Ma y  1776. B y  the  specific 
language o f the ordinance, English statutes passed since  1607 were not  included. 
 
 
70 Wallace  v. Taliaferro   , 2 Call 447, 469 (1800). 
71 Id. at 489. 
72 Jollife   v. Hite , 1 Call 301, 328 (1798). 
73 Commonwealth  v. Lilly's   admr. , 1 Leigh 525 (1830). See also Boiling v. Mayor,   3 Ran- 
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This had the disadvantage o f eliminating salutary English laws passed since that 
date, but the theory  was that most such statutes had already been adopted by  the 
colonial legislatures or soon woul d be by the new General Assembly. 7 5   An d  this 
proved true enough. The new Virginia legislature di d copy many prior English sta- 
tutes, such as the statute o f frauds, 7 6   making certain improvements  where neces- 
sary. 7 7  The reception statute o f 1776 also accepted only Britis h statutes "whic h are 
o f a general nature, not local to that kingdo m . . . " . 7 8   As St. George Tucker phrased 
it ,  this  meant that  some English enactments  di d  not transfer  because they  were 
considered "obsolete, or have been deemed inapplicable to our local circumstances 
and po l icy." 7 9   Finally, and most importantly, the acceptance o f Britis h statutes was 
only "unti l the same shall be altered by the legislative power o f this colony." 8 0   I t 
was  here  that  the  most  significant  activity  occurred,  as  the  Virgini a   General 
Assembly  undertook between  1776 and  1792 a "révisai"  o f the laws o f  Virginia 
whic h  significantly  altered both the common law  and statute law  o f England as 
they had been originally  adopted i n Ma y  o f  1776. 8 1   Wit h  the completion o f  the 
révisai i n  1791, the General Assembly was evidently satisfied wit h its comprehen- 
sive nature because, i n that year, it moved to repeal the ordinance o f 1776 adopting 
the Brit ish statutes, and that thenceforth, "n o such statute or act o f parliament shall 
have any force or authority withi n this commonwealth." 8 2   I n repealing the Brit ish 
legislation,  the  General  Assembly  sought  to  come  ful l  circle  and  exercise,  i n 
St. George Tucker's phrase, "the undisputed right whic h every free state possesses, 
o f being governed by its ow n laws." 8 3   I n doing so, however, the legislature i n no 
way intended that its constituents should be deprived o f any o f the liberties  whic h 
had been enjoyed under  Britis h  law.  To  ensure  that  such woul d  be  the  case, a 
caveat was inserted i n the 1792 legislation preserving "al l  rights  arising under any 
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such statute or act . . .  and . . .  the  right  and benefit  o f all  . . .  writs, remedial  and 
jud ic ia l . .  . " . 8 4 
 
I n its application o f the English legal heritage to Virginia's new order, the Virgi - 
nia Court o f Appeals went a long way toward enunciating and defining the nature 
o f Virginia's  Revolutionary  settlement. The  first  and most important  attribute  o f 
this judicia l  settlement was the traditional  and conservative nature o f the  court's 
approach to change i n the legal traditions  inherited  from  England. The  reliance 
upon existing rules o f law maintained the libertarian aspects o f the English com- 
mon law, but also had the effect o f protecting property rights and thereby  sustain- 
ing the existing social order. 
The Court o f Appeals, however, was not slavish i n its devotion to English law. 
The  most  important  exception  to  the  court's  usual  loyalty  to  traditional  legal 
rules occurred when the Virgini a  General Assembly  overruled English statute or 
common law by statutory enactment. The court at all times deferred to the legis- 
lature i n  such instances, displaying a respect for  the more "popular "  (i.e.  demo- 
cratically elected) branch o f republican government and its policy  determinations. 
A t  the  same  time,  the  court  continued  to  support  traditional  rules  o f  law  and 
property unless they were directly and unequivocally overruled by the General 
Assembly. 
Moreover, the Virginia Court  o f Appeals displayed a distinctly pragmatic  vein 
when i t came to the application o f English precedents. For example, it refused to 
do so when the results did not comport wi t h the realities o f Virginia's situation, or 
when the technical rules o f the commo n law yielded an unreasonable result. 
I n all o f this, one fact emerges as particularly  striking. Throughout the period 
stretching from the Revolution to 1830, the Court o f Appeals displayed a remark- 
able consistency i n its approach to the salient issues whic h arose. The court  dis- 
played a l ik e respect for traditional rules o f law i n the 1790s as i n the 1830s. Simi- 
larly, respect for  statutory pronouncements  spanned the decades under study, and 
the same continuity can be seen i n the other topics discussed. Indeed, i n all areas, 
examples o f judicia l  attitudes can be drawn as easily from  the early  nineteenth- 
century reports as from those o f the late eighteenth century. I t is significant that, i n 
1830, the Court  o f Appeals was evincing  a judicia l  approach nearly  identical  to 
that o f forty and fifty  years earlier. This doctrinal stability i n the face o f social and 
economic change i n the Commonwealth woul d loo m as important as many o f the 
court's substantive pronouncements. 
 
A  corollary  to these conclusions pertains to the evolving role o f  the Court  o f 
Appeals. I n the decades between the Revolution and 1830, the court became a key 
player i n the process o f defining the nature o f Virginia's adaptation to its new sta- 
tus as a republican commonwealth free from the dictates o f English law and pol- 
icy. Perhaps no other institution made a greater contribution to the complex task o f 
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interweaving the threads o f the English legal heritage into the fabric  o f a republi- 
can  legal  system.  Thus,  by  1830,  not  only  had  the  Virgini a  Court  o f  Appeals 
played  a pivota l  role  i n  establishing  and  defining  Virginia's  new  constitutional 
order, but i t had also been instrumental i n adapting the inherited English legal sys- 
tem to a republican commonwealth. 
 
